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ABSOLUTE POWER TO DISPOSE-JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton, 468 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. 1971)
I. Powell Morton devised to his wife a life estate in certain real
property in Georgia. To the life estate, the testator superadded an
"absolute power to dispose."' There followed a gift over to the re-
maindermen if the testator's wife had not disposed of the property
before her death.2 During her life, the life tenant Mrs. Morton sold
the Georgia property and with the proceeds created a revocable trust
for the benefit of herself and her own relatives. After Mrs. Morton's
death, the trustee3 sought an interpretation of her husband's will to
determine who should prevail as between the beneficiaries under the
wife's trust and the remaindermen4 under her husband's will. The
court, thus faced the question of whether Mrs. Morton, as life tenant
with an absolute power to dispose, had disposed of the property in such
a manner as to cut out the remaindermen under her husband's will.
Held: the conversion of the real property into proceeds by the life
tenant did not give the life tenant a fee simple interest; and the depos-
iting of the proceeds in a trust did not prevent them from passing to
the remaindermen at the death of the life tenant.5
The absolute power to dispose" is not an estate;7 it is a power
1. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton, 468 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Mo. 1971). The
pertinent section of I. Powell Morton's will is the following:
Item One(b) Any interest which I may own at the date of my death in real
property located in Clarke County, Georgia, I devise to my said wife, if she
survive me, for her life. I give to my said wife the absolute power to dispose
of said real property during her life. Upon her death, if she has not dis-
posed of said real property, or upon my death if she does not survive me...
I give said real property per capita to those persons named at the end of
Item Four(b) (3) who are then living.
2. Id.
3. The trustee here referred to is the trustee for the revocable trust which the
life tenant Mrs. Morton established with the proceeds from the Georgia property.
4. The remaindermen, the defendants in the present action, are I. Powell Morton's
nieces and nephews, named as the ultimate beneficiaries in the residuary clauses of
his will.
5. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton, 468 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo. 1971).
6. The word "dispose" is a rather comprehensive term. In addition to the power
to sell, courts have, at times, defined "dispose" to include such powers as to mortgage,
to lease, to partition, to will, to donate, etc.; see, e.g. Phelps v. Harris, 101 U.S. 370,
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which the testator superadds to the basic estate devised.8 It can be
added to a life estate or an estate for years. 9 When added to a life
estate, the absolute power to dispose, which always includes the power
to convey a fee simple, 10 presents the problem of whether the addition
of the power is so significant as to change the life estate into some-
thing else. 1 It is well-established, however, that the addition of the
power does not destroy the life estate,12 nor does it enlarge the life
estate into a fee.' 3 About five jurisdictions treat a life estate with a
power to convey a fee as an estate in fee simple for certain limited
purposes, such as for the benefit of creditors, purchasers, and encum-
brancers. 14
Although the addition of the power to dispose does not enlarge
the life estate, it may be considered as evidence of the testator's intent
380 (1879), in which it is said, "[tihe expression to 'dispose of' is very broad, and signi-
fies more than to sell;" courts generally use the words "dispose" and "consume" and
"invade" interchangeably. See, e.g., Bollenger v. Bray, 411 S.W. 65, 69 (Mo. 1967).
7. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 111 (1936); Casner, Legal Life Estates and
Powers of Appointment Coupled With Life Estates and Trusts, 45 NEB. L. REV.
342 (1966), in which Professor Casner presents a valuable discussion of the
advantages of creating a legal life estate with remainders over rather than putting the
land in trust, with income drawing for life to the intended beneficiary and remainders
over.
8. L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, THE LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS § 874 (2d ed. 1956)
(hereinafter cited as SIMEs & SMITH); Note, The Power to Consume, 36 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 218 (1961).
9. RESTATEMENTOF PROPERTY § 111 (1936).
10. See Commercial Bank v. Sutterwhite, 413 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1967); SIMES &
SMITH § 892 at 361:
A power to sell is commonly held not to include a power to mortgage;
nor will it include a power to make a gift. But, of course, no hard and
fast rules are applied to determine such questions.
11. SIMES & SMim § 893; Swenson, The Iowa Repugnancy Rule in Testamentary
Dispositions, 41 IowA L. REv. 601 (1955-56).
12. Graham v. Stroh, 342 Mo. 686, 117 S.W.2d 258 (1938); see note 13 infra.
13. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton, 468 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Mo. 1971); Van
Every v. McKay, 331 Mo. 355, 53 S.W.2d 873 (1932); Hammer v. Edwards, 327 Mo.
281, 293, 36 S.W.2d 929, 934 (1931); Grace v. Perry, 197 Mo. 550, 95 S.W. 875 (1906);
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.15 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); SIMnEs & SMrni § 1488
at 378:
The authorities are overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition that an un-
limited power to dispose of the fee or absolute interest when coupled with a
life estate does not enlarge the life estate to a fee or absolute interest, and
the remainder which follows it is valid.
14. ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 76 (1958); see N.Y. REAL PROP. § 378 (McKinney
1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 262 (1971); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. 43-11-18
(1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 232.08 (1957).
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to devise a fee in situations where the testator's language does not
clearly indicate the desire to create a life estate. 15 Courts have judi-
cially fashioned certain constructional preferences when faced with the
ambiguity the gift of an absolute power to dispose can present: (1)
when the initial gift of the fee is clear, the addition of the power will
not cut the fee down;'16 (2) when the initial devisement of the fee is
clear, the addition of a power to dispose and an express provision for
the remainder will not destroy the fee;" (3) when the initial gift is
general and there is an express creation of the power to dispose and
no gift over, courts will find a fee;' s (4) but when the initial gift is gen-
eral and there is a subsequent gift over of what remains, the imme-
diate devisee will take a life estate with a power to dispose (even when
there is no express mention of the power to dispose).' 9 These con-
structional preferences, however, must be treated with caution, for as
the court in Shelton v. Shelton20 noted, "the language of one will is
rarely, if ever, like another and frequently a slight difference in the
words used calls for different constructions of testamentary provisions
similar in other respects." 2' The power to dispose can be created
15. Giroir v. Dumesnil, 248 La. 1037, 184 So. 2d 1, 6-7 (1966); Ironside v.
Ironside, 150 Iowa 628, 633, 130 N.W. 414, 416 (1911); SIMEs & SIrrH § 893.
16. Glidewell v. Glidewell, 360 Mo. 713, 718, 230 S.W.2d 752, 755 (1950), after
discussing several previous cases, the court concluded, "[tihe cases cited . . . reaffirm
the general uncontraverted rules that 'a limitation over after a devise of the fee is
void' and 'a devise of the fee cannot be cut down by subsequent ambiguous language."'
Vaughan v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 235 S.W.2d 328 (1951). See SIMEs & SMrrH
§ 893 and § 1488-90 (and cases collected therein).
17. Id.
18. Vaughn v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 235 S.W.2d 328 (1951). See SiMms
& SMITH § 893 and §§ 1488-90 (and cases collected therein).
19. Shelton v. Shelton, 348 Mo. 820, 155 S.W.2d 187 (1941); Van Every v.
McKay, 331 Mo. 355, 53 S.W.2d 873 (1932); Burnet v. Burnet, 224 Mo. 491, 148 S.W.
872 (1912); Armor v. Frey, 226 Mo. 646, 126 S.W. 483 (1910). See SIMES &
SMITH § 893 and H8 1488-90 (and cases collected therein).
20. Shelton v. Shelton, 348 Mo. 820, 155 S.W.2d 187 (1941).
21. In re White's Estate, 43 Misc. 2d 414, 251 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (1964) (creation
of power to dispose by implication); Bowman v. Bowman, 3 Ohio Misc. 161, 210
N.E.2d 920, 924 (1965) (express creation of power to dispose); Burnet v. Burnet,
224 Mo. 491, 148 S.W. 872 (1912) wherein the court rather succinctly states that the
power of disposal can arise either by implication or expressly:
The principle to be extracted from these cases is that where a life estate is
created whether by implication only or in express words, with a remainder
over, the power of the life tenant to defeat the remainder depends upon the
exercise of a superadded power of disposition expressly or impliedly given
by the will ....
SIMES & SMITH 88 892-93.
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either expressly or by implication. When expressly created, the fol-
lowing language is often employed: "all my estate . . . with right
and power in him to sell .. or dispose,' 22 "my estate . . . with full
and complete capacity, with full and complete discretion capacity, au-
thority and power . . . to sell, grant, convey, and deliver,"23 and
"all my estate. . . real and personal or mixed . to be empowered
to sell or dispose of it at pleasure. '2 4  When created by implication,
the pregnant phrase is -usually found in an item providing for a gift
over of the undisposed portion of the testator's estate: "upon the
death of the survivor of us.. . if there shall be any property remaining
undisposed of. .. we give. ... 5
The power to dispose may be either absolute or limited.20 Once
courts have found a power to dispose, they closely scrutinize the testa-
tor's language to determine if he has conditioned or limited the exer-
cise of the power. Courts generally will construe the power as limited
if there is any language at all which will support that construction.r
The power to dispose has been held to be limited by such language
as "for her proper support and maintenance," 28 "to support in the
manner . . . she is accustomed,"2' 9 and "as may be necessary. °30 The
courts reason that the testator primarily intended the immediate de-
visee to take a life interest and that the power to dispose was super-
added only to meet any problem which might arise if the income
from the life interest was inadequate to support the life tenant; and if
the testator wished the life tenant to have an unlimited power of dis-
posal, he would not have created a life estate with an explicit gift over.
The judicial test applied to determine if the life tenant has exercised
22. Morisseau v. Biesterfeldt, 345 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1961).
23. Bollenger v. Bray, 411 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967).
24. Redman v. Barger, 118 Mo. 568, 24 S.W. 177 (1893).
25. Glidewell v. Glidewell, 360 Mo. 713, 230 S.W.2d 752 (1950).
26. See, e.g., Dekker v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ill. 1965) (creation
of absolute power to dispose); Osborn v. Morrison, 132 Ga. 169, 132 S.E.2d 58
(1963) (creation of limited power to dispose).
27. See Bollenger v. Bray, 411 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967); Griffin v. Nicholas, 224
Mo. 275, 123 S.W. 1063 (1909) (dissenting opinion), later adopted en banc, Cook v.
Higgins, 290 Mo. 402, 235 S.W. 807 (1921).
28. Flesher v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 119, 121-22 (N.D. W.Va. 1965);
See also Griffin v. Nicholas, 224 Mo. 275, 123 S.W. 1063 (1909) (dissenting opinion).
29. Bollenger v. Bray, 411 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967).
30. Kern v. Kern, 100 Ohio App. 327, 331, 136 N.E.2d 675, 679 (1955); Morisseau
v. Biersterfeldt, 345 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1961).
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his power in accordance with the limitations cited above is whether
there was a reasonable necessity of the life tenant to justify invasion
of the corpus of the estate.3 The test implies that before a conver-
sion of real property will be allowed, personalty and income must be
insufficient.
An absolute power to dispose will result when there is a gift of the
power with no subsequent limiting language. 2 Generally, the holder
of an absolute power of disposal can dispose of the property as he
pleases;33: but many jurisdictions deny him the following rights: (1) to
give away the property;34 (2) to make a testamentary disposition;35 and
(3) to waste or squander the property for the purpose of defeating the
remainderman's interest.3 6 The tests, which courts apply to determine
if the absolute power to dispose was properly exercised, vary greatly.
Some courts apply a "reasonable necessity test," similar to that used
to evaluate a limited power of disposal, while other courts apply a
mere "good faith" test.3 7
When the life tenant with absolute power of disposal exercises his
power by sale, the life tenant's interest in the proceeds is not enlarged
into a fee.3 He continues to have a life interest only, but his life in-
31. Bollenger v. Bray, 411 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967).
32. The cases cited in notes 28-30 supra demonstrate that courts prefer to find
a limited power to dispose and will give full force to any language which might be
interpreted as limiting the exercise of the power. After all, an absolute power to
dispose is a rather free-wheeling power and can lead courts into many rather tenuous
distinctions.
33. Many courts, which have given extended analysis to the absolute power to
dispose, have been primarily concerned with the tax consequences of such a power for
the marital deduction under INT. REv. CoDE oip 1954 § 2056. For a valid marital
deduction, "the power (to dispose) must include the right to transfer the property
absolutely with or without consideration, that is, both the right to sell and to donate,
in complete derogation of the rights of the remainderman," Burnet v. United States,
314 F. Supp. 492 (D. S.C. 1970).
34. See Burnet v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 492, 495 (D. S.C. 1970) (see
especially footnote 3 of the court at 495); Burnet v. Burnet, 244 Mo. 491, 506, 148
S.W. 872, 877 (1912).
35. See note 34 supra; In re Western Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank, 424 Pa. 161,
225 A.2d 676 (1967).
36. Anderson v. Kennon, 353 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
37. In re Estate of Gramm, 420 Pa. 510, 218 A.2d 342 (1966); United States v.
Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Koos' Estate,
269 Wis. 478, 69 N.W.2d 598 (1955).
38. Bridges v. First Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 430 S.W.2d 376, 381 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968); In re Estate of Gramm, 420 Pa. 510, 218 A.2d 342 (1966); Morisseau v.
Biesterfeldt, 345 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1961); Guthrie v. Crews, 286 Mo. 438, 229 S.W.
182 (1920).
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terest with the power to dispose will now be in proceeds rather than
realty. If the life tenant further disposes of the proceeds to purchase
property, the remainderman's interest will attach to whatever property
is purchased with the proceeds. Numerous cases have recognized that
a change in the form of the estate will not enlarge the life tenant's
interest .9  Thus whether the life tenant uses the proceeds to purchase
land, paintings, or books, the remainderman's interest will attach to the
property. The court in Guthrie v. Crews" recognized that to allow a
life tenant, by an exercise of the power, to defeat the interest of the
remainderman would be in blatant disregard of the testator's provision
that the life tenant be only a life tenant and that if there was a residue,
it should go to his chosen remainderman.
A few courts, however, have provided examples of positive acts by
which the life tenant with an absolute power to dispose could defeat
the remainderman's interest in the proceeds: (1) The life tenant could
consume the proceeds by -using them for his own maintenance even in
situations where the life tenant has other funds which more than ade-
quately meet his needs. 41  Thus if the life tenant carefully segregates
his own funds from the proceeds, he can extinguish the remainderman's
interest by consuming the proceeds, while reserving his other funds for
any of the purposes for which the use of the proceeds is prohibited;42
(2) The life tenant could use the proceeds to purchase life insurance or
to buy U.S. Savings Bonds, as was done in Edds v. Mitchell.4 The
39. Olsen v. Weber, 194 Iowa 512, 515, 187 N.W. 465, 466 (1922) (life tenant sold
the land and used the proceeds to purchase other land; then exchanged newly purchased
land for other land; held, remainderman's interest attached to each piece of property
acquired); In re Beaty's Estate, 172 Iowa 714, 715, 154 N.W. 1028, 1031 (1915) (a
change in the form or identity of the property could have no effect to enlarge or change
the life tenant's title thereto); Anderson & Co. v. Hall's Adm'r & Co., 80 Ky. 91 (1882)
(remainderman allowed to follow proceeds from sale of realty into other realty pur-
chased with the proceeds); see Annot., 158 A.L.R. 480 et seq. (1945).
40. Guthrie v. Crews, 286 Mo. 438, 229 S.W. 182 (1920).
41. In re Estate of Gramm, 437 Pa. 381, 263 A.2d 445 (1970); Nielson v.
Duyvejonck, 94 Ill. App. 2d 224, 236 N.E.2d 743, 746 (1968); C.C. Young
Memorial Home for Aged Women v. Nelms, 223 S.W.2d 302, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
42. This may seem like a gimmick which the life tenant indulges in to defeat the
remainderman's interest. And so it is. But when the testator chooses to add the ab-
solute power to dispose to a life estate, he is bestowing on the life tenant such a
broad power that courts can be expected to have difficulty in imposing limits when
the testator himself has chosen to make the power unlimited.
43. Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 320, 184 S.W.2d 823, 830 (1945):
A life insurance policy for the benefit of another is perhaps the best illustra-
[Vol. 1972:359
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remainderman's interest attaches to whatever property is purchased
with the proceeds, but here the very property purchased creates inter-
ests which ultimately defeat the remainderman's gift. For example,
the remainderman has an interest in the life insurance policy while
the life tenant is alive. But at the life tenant's death, the beneficiary
under the policy succeeds to the benefits of the policy. Thus, the
remainderman's interest in those proceeds which were used to pay
the premiums on the policy has been extinguished; 44 or (3) The life
tenant may make a purchase such as was made in In re Smith's Will,45
in which the life tenant used the proceeds to purchase diamonds for
personal adornment rather than investment. The court found that the
proceeds had changed species to such an extent that the remainderman
should no longer have the right to trace them.4 6  The life tenant will
thus defeat the remainderman's interest if at his death he has consumed
the proceeds, left no property which stands in place of the proceeds,
or has used the proceeds to purchase property such as insurance poli-
cies which create indefeasibly vested interests in third parties at the life
tenant's death.
In St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Morton, there was an express
creation of an absolute power to dispose.17  The court acknowledged
that Missouri cases had developed the rule that the conversion of
real property into proceeds does not enlarge the life tenant's interest.
The life tenant will not hold the proceeds in fee unless the testator
further provided that he should so hold. The Morton court, finding
no such provision, concluded that the proceeds, even though deposited
in trust, belonged to the remaindermen.' s
tion of a contract for the benefit of a donee beneficiary. When the insurance
is effected in favor of a third person, his rights under the policy vest
immediately, and they can be affected or terminated, without his consent,
only in the manner provided by the policy or by the law. If the policy gives
the insured the power to change the beneficiary, the right of the beneficiary
named in the policy is not indefeasible but it is nevertheless a vested right.
The court goes on to note that when the person whose life is insured dies, the rights
of the beneficiary under the policy are indefeasibly vested.
44. Id. By this life insurance "ruse" the life tenant has diverted proceeds from
the remainderman and at the same time made a testamentary disposition of the pro-
ceeds to the life tenant's own chosen beneficiaries.
45. In re Smith's Will, 231 App. Div. 277, 247 N.Y.S. 263 (1931).
46. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 85 (1951).
47. See note 1 supra.
48. 468 S.W.2d at 198.
Vol. 1972:359] 365
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The Morton court verged on a novel question which apparently
neither the court nor the attorneys felt the necessity to discuss: wheth-
er the life tenant had exercised her absolute power to dispose in
such a manner by the creation of the trust as to defeat the remain-
dermen's gift? The Morton court perfunctorily dismissed the issue by
stating that the absolute power to dispose entitled the holder only to
use the proceeds. The fact that Mrs. Morton used the proceeds to
create a revocable trust did not in any way affect the remainderman's
interest. But in so holding the court may have disregarded a legitimate
exercise of the power to dispose. Perhaps Mrs. Morton felt the need
to put her money in trust in order to provide wisely for herself and to
care for those of her relatives to whom she felt a responsibility. Per-
haps there were certain tax advantages to creating the trust. Thus,
the trust may have fulfilled a legitimate objective of Mrs. Morton's
financial plans while she was alive. And at her death, the rights of
the other trust beneficiaries should have become indefeasibly vested
since the power to revoke the trust was personal to Mrs. Morton and
did not pass to her successors at death.49  Under the rationale out-
lined in Edds v. Mitchell,0 Mrs. Morton had created indefeasibly
vested rights to the proceeds in third parties, thus effectively disposing
of the proceeds in derogation of the rights of the remaindermen under
her husband's will. But neither the Missouri Court in Morton nor the
Pennsylvania court in In re Estate of Gramm,51 a case similar to Mor-
ton, considered such an argument since it was not called to their atten-
tion.
The testator in creating an absolute power to dispose gives the life
tenant wide discretion in consuming the life estate. It seems that
when the life tenant has determined that the creation of a trust out
of the proceeds serves a useful purpose, the courts should be reluctant
to disregard her judgment unless it is clearly apparent that the life
tenant was acting in bad faith and was actually attempting to destroy
the remainderman's interest. In prohibiting inter vivos gifts of the
proceeds, testamentary gifts, and waste,5 2 the courts may conclusively
presume that the life tenant is attempting to extinguish the remainder,
but in all other cases, the courts should be careful to respect the wide
49. G. BOGART, LAW OF TRUSTS 385 (4th ed. 1963).
50. See note 43 supra.
51. In re Estate of Gramm, 420 Pa. 510, 218 A.2d 342 (1966).
52. See notes 32-37 supra.
[Vol. 1972:359
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discretion the testator has placed in the life tenant by making the
power to dispose absolute. In Morton, the trust may have been merely
a scheme through which Mrs. Morton was attempting to give the prop-
erty to her own relatives, but the court should have, at least, considered
the possibility that the life tenant was properly exercising her discretion.
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